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CHAPTER 0 INTRODUCTION 
George Stigler once said that innovative ideas in the 
present have actually been conceived of by great scholars in the 
past:. I think this is the significance of the study of history 
of economic thought. Historians of economic thought may 
interpret the past scholars in terms of present day concepts, or 
tliey may compare the theory of the past scholars with theirs, 
seeking out similarity, difference, continuity and extension. 
These jobs help us get acquainted with our predecessors more 
(deeply on the one hand, and give insights that enlighten us on 
our subject on the other. As Coase put it, we still have a lot • 
to learn from our father of economics, Adam Smith J 
Before the 60's of this century, experts on Adam Smith 
concentrated on his economic theory such as the discussion of 
price, value, distribution, growth and foreign trade. In the 
past two decades, as economic analysis has spread to other fields 
than those traditionally concerned, scholars like to see to what 
extent Adam Smith foresaw these trends and how his whole 
intellectual enterprise contributes to our understanding of the 
present day issues. And, of course, every study of A d a . Smith 
adds to our understanding of him, some of whose ideas may not be 
‘ Leube and Moore 1986, intro., p.xxv. 
‘ Coase 1977, p.309. 
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clarified when the time has not yet come. 
Modern discussion of political economy is a tremendous 
success in the application of economic analysis. The theory of 
public choice has led us to view those unsolved problem that 
previously could not be solved by traditional method. When this 
field of study became consolidated and formed its shape, 
historians of economic thought have a lot to do. It is the aim 
of the present study to see what Adam Smith had said about 
political economy. We would like to see what difference is there 
between his ultimate concern and that of our modern political 
economists. From this investigation, understanding of Smith is 
added and misunderstanding of him solved. 
In an essay on political economy. Stigler. [1971b] came to . 
the conclusion that Adam Smith did not consistently apply the 
principle of self-interest in the political sphere. This 
controversial essay caused a debate in which West [1979] defended 
Adain smith. The present study aims at two things: first, to 
support and supplement West's argument by drawing evidences from 
Smith's other works, namely his Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
reported Lectures on Jurisprudence; and second, to clarify 
Stigler,s misconception about the role of justice in Smith's 
wealth Of Nations. We shall see that the two books mentioned 
above subtly introduce a point of departure for us to unfold an 
interesting but neglected theme which runs through the whole 
works of Smith. 
2 
I shall argue that some of the most important aspects of 
Smith's projected work of natural jurisprudence can be 
reconstructed from the Theory of Moral Sentiments and Lectures 
on Jurisprudence. This task helps us understand why West's 
comment can be improved, and why Stigler's misunderstanding of 
the role of justice in the Wealth of Nations can be clarified. 
It appears that Stigler's criticisms on Adam Smith were based on 
his reading of the Wealth of Nations. But the Wealth of Nations 
is mainly a treatise on economics, whereas the ideas of Adarn 
Smith on government are found in his other writings. When all 
his works are studied, we can find that there is a consistent 
theme running through. In other words, the so-called Adam Smith 
Problem in the history of economic thought is not a real problem. 
Chapter 1 delineates the arguments of Stigler in [1971b] and ' 
[1982] into two main points which are relevant to our discussion 
in the present study. Chapter 2 reviews the co画ents of West on 
Stigleris position. Chapters 3. 4 and 5 clarify and supplement 、 
West's arguments, thereby introduce Smith's spectator theory and 
theory of justice and how they are the foundation of all laws. 
Chapter 6 deals with Stigler's misunderstanding of Smith. A 
conclusion is given in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 1 STIGLER ON THE POLITICAL^ ECONOMY OF ADAM SMITH 
I 
During the past few decades, economics has been widely 
applied to various fields other than those traditionally 
concerned. In the so called Chicago School, notably led by 
Becker and Stigler, economic theory, defined in its most abstract 
form as the logic of choice, has been successfully employed to 
explain behaviour in sociological and political spheres. Becker 
applied the maximization postulate to explain various sorts of 
human behaviour^ The peak of such a contribution is his most 
celebrated A Treatise on the Faml1v: . stigler, who seems to 
have a special liking for the study of political behaviour, came • 
to his most influential conclusion in the article "The Theory of 
Economic R e g u l a t i o n w h i c h is the crystal of his lifelong study 
in the application of economic reasoning in the political sphere. 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the main thesis in 
the theory of economic regulation, and also the general attitude 
of Stigler towards economics and the role of economists. 
Bec^ker, G . S” The Economic Anprn^r-h to Human 
Behaviours . (Chicago, 1976)" ^ — — — — 
1981): Becker, G. S., A Treatise on th^ p口…” (Harvard, 
Roll T t. Stigler, G. J. , "The Economic Theorv of Regulation" 
Bell J. Econ. Manage, .q^ i 2 (Spring 1971). • ^eguiacion ‘ 
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II 
In Stigler [1971a], the Chicago professor addressed to his 
fellow economists what should be the objectives proposed for an 
economic theory of regulation: 
The central tasks of the theory of economic regulation are 
to explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of 
regulation, what form regulation will take, and the effects 
？f regulation upon the allocation of resources [Sticiler 
1971a, p.3]. 
Before the Stiglerian view is widely accepted, according to 
Stigler, two other views of regulation of industry are widely 
held. The first of these is generally known as the public 
interest theory of regulation, which holds the belief that 
regulation is instituted primarily for the protection and benefit 
of the public at large. The second of these is that there can 
be no rational explanation for political behaviour and process. 
In Stigler's description, 
"politics" is an imponderable, a constantly ^nd 
unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the moft diverse 
nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue ?the 
emancipation of slaves) and of the most vulgar venalitv tSe 
congressman feathering his。wn nest) [Stigler 1971^ p I S ? 
Obviously, Stigler is not satisfied with the traditional views 
of regulation of industry, the explanatory power of which do not 
meet the objectives listed above for a consistent theory of 
regulation. In the recent decade, a vast number of empirical 
5 
researches have been done to investigate what are the possible 
effects of regulations, the proposed goals of which are for the 
benefit of the general public. Unfortunately, the so-called 
public.interest theory fails to survive under these scrutinizing 
researches. Minimum wage laws, price controls, occupational 
licensing, consumer safety regulations, environmental protection, 
etc, almost all of these not only cannot achieve the proposed 
goals, but they even make things worse. Friedman's advocation 
of a limited government is not without a cause. 
As to the second view of regulation, it is almost 
unnecessary to explain why it exasperates the Chicago economist. 
So what is the Stiglerian view of regulation? Regulation 
is neither for the public interest, nor defies rational . 
explanation, it is simply a "product" of the "demand" for it by 
special interest groups. "[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired 
by the industry and is designed、and operated primarily for its 
benefits.丨,彳 How can that be? Stigler says that the state has 
the power to coerce, which is not shared with even the mightiest 
of its citizens. The state can "seize money" through taxation 
without the consent of the households and firms. It is this 
power to coerce which is exploited by economic groups (e.g., 
industry) to increase its pecuniary gain or profitability. it 
is not our interest to discuss here in detail how a particular 
industry or an interest group actually seeks benefit from its 
demand for regulation. Our attention will be focused, however, 
‘ Stigler 1971a, p.3. 
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on the general principle behind such a view, which starts the 
central theme of our study. 
Such a view on political behaviour is no different from 
that on everyday economic affairs. Modern economists regard an 
individual as a maximization unit. His behaviour is constrained 
by environment in the presence of scarcity, in which he has to 
maximize his utility. Becker's theory of household assumes that 
every household allocates its income and time on household 
commodities to maximize utility. To Becker, behaviours on 
fertility, crime and punishment, law enforcement, etc. cannot 
escape such a general principle of human nature, At the base of 
such a view of human nature, self—interest seems to be the only 
driving force (altruism can also be viewe(5 in the light of self — 
interest; just incorporate the utility of others who are cared . 
for as a variable in his utility function). To stigler, 
therefore, self-interest no doubt underlies the demand for 
regulation by interest groups. Thus the self-dnterested 
merchants institute industry regulations so as to maximize their 
pecuniary gain; with no role played by their regard for the 
public interest. It is this view of regulation that gives 
insights as to the questions who will receive benefits of a 
regulation (which economic group is urging for the institution 
of the regulation) ； what form regulation will take (the form 
that will yield the largest net gain). 
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Ill 
Having reviewed the basic idea of the theory of economic 
regulation, we shall come to the central and more general problem 
of our present study. In 1971, Stigler in his most controversial 
essay openly deplored the failure of Adam Smith, our founder of 
modern economics, to consistently apply the principle of self-
interest in the political arena.' 
Before we trace out how Stigler arrived at such a thesis, 
we first try to understand Stigler丨s attitude toward the economic 
profession and the role of economists. Stigler asserted, after 
surveying the professional works of the economists, that “ 
economist are not addicted to taking frequent and disputatious 
policy p o s i t i o n s " . H e said that "[t]he great economists... have . 
not been preoccupied with preaching"/ By preaching, Stigler 
meant that it is "simply a clear and reasoned recommendation 
(or, more often, denunciation) of a policy or form of behaviour 
by men or societies of men" J Stigler insisted that the niain 
task of economics has always been to explain real economic 
Phenomena in general terms. In spite of these, "mortal i.an 
cannot wholly abstain from all instruction to the young, the 
Hist 'of P^i^iglf, G. ^ V Travels on the Ship of State" 
(Fall 1971), reprinted in Skinner； 
_ Wilson, T. eds, Essays on Adam Smith. (Oxford, 1975). 
K. R / a n a by Leube, 
7 Stigler 1982, p.305. 
‘ Stigler 1982, p.304. 
8 
inferior, and the great".〗 He found that the main theme of 
economist-preachers have been efficiency, which is the main 
prescription of normative economists. He observed the attitude 
of an economist-preacher: 
He in a world of social mistakes, ancient and modern, 
，广tie and simple, and since he is si叩ly pointing out to 
the society that what it seeks, it is seeking inefficiently 
he need not quarrel with what it seeks [Stigler 1982,' 
p • vj U o J • 
And therefore Stigler said, 
A world full of mistakes!... Such well-meaning, incompetent 
societies need their economic efficiency experts, and we are 
tlieir se丄f —chosen saviours [Stigler 1982 , p. 308]. 
Stigler believed that "this view of society as a community 
with acceptable, if not always admirable, goals but possessing . 
only a feeble understanding of efficient methods of achieving 
them was and is profoundly mistaken".'-' Thus according to this 
view protective tariffs or usury law to be found in most 
countries are due to confusion rather than purposeful action. 
Stigler was most unsatisfied with "explanatory" principles that 
dismiss inexplicable phenomena as mistakes. After all his 
positive attitude toward economics is to explain phenomena in 
general terms, he does not believe in social mistakes! And 
therefore he regards those innumerable criticisms of inefficiency 
of various policies as in vain. Preaching efficiency appeases 
only the preacher's satisfaction. • 
？ Stigler 1982, p.306. 
” Stigler 1982, p.308. 
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Such a discussion of Stigler's attitude towards economist 
as preacher and his belief in no social mistakes helps us 
understand more clearly his criticism on Adam Smith. 
IV 
We can ciiscuss the main theme in Stigler [1971b] in two 
respects, each of which bears relevance to our previous 
discussion of his attitude towards economics and economist as 
preacher. The first of these is the conclusion that Smith did 
not consistently apply the principle of self-interest in the 
political scene, although Stigler admitted that in the Wealth of 
Nation self-interest dominates the majority of men in all 
CO細ercial undertakings. Stigler at first compiled a list of 
instances in which legislation is explained by the interests of ‘ 
several economic groups in the Wealth of Nation. However,, he 
also observed there are many and important failure to analyze 
political phenomena in terms of self-interest. This is contrary 
to the proposition that "the procuring of favourable legislation 
a CO 誦 ercial under taking"�！，and ,,[a]ll legislation with 
important economic effects is the calculated achievement of 
interested economic classes . 
Stigler gave a number of examples in which Smith failed to 
do what Stigler proposed. To cite a few of them: 
” Stigler 1971b, p.238. 
'' Stigler 1971b, p.240. 
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(a) The practice of primogeniture has lost its onetime role 
of achieving security of property, and injures the landowner [WN, 
III- ii• 4-6], 
(b) The institution of slavery is uneconomic, but panders 
to pride [WN, III. 士士. 9 & 10], 
(c) Absolute governments treat slaves more kindly than 
republican states [WN, IV. vii. b.54], 
(d) Laws against forestallers, engrossers, etc., serve 
only to appease popular prejudice [WN, IV. v.b.7-26], 
(e) The legislation against corn traders is so perverse 
as to lead Smith to compare it to laws concerning religion [WN, 
工V. v.b.40], and 
(f) The mercantile policies directed to the improvement of 
the balance of trade with particular countries have their origin ‘ 
in 'national prejudice and animosity [WN, IV. iii. a.l]. 
V Just these examples can show how impatient Stigler was to 
Smith. How come an institution (primogeniture) prevails to no 
one's benefit? Also, how come the institution of slavery served 
pride but not production and so on so forth? But Smith did not 
give convincing explanations. If economic explanations are to 
be found pecuniary gain should be the only force that drive the 
self-interest of economic groups in political scene. Opinion, 
prejudice and animosity are not allowed to play a role. m 
short, there is no trace of the theory of economic regulation and 
government in the Wealth of Nations• 
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The second respect is the issue of economist as preacher. 
Stigler's description is vivid: 
， m i ^ attitude toward political behaviour was not dissimilar 
to that of a parent towards a child: the child was often 
ijiistaken and sometimes perverse, but normally it would 
g m ^ g r in conduct if properly instructed [Stigler 1971b 
Smith's attitude was, therefore, sometimes normative. Consider 
the canons of taxation: 
.1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the 
support of government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to 
their respective abilities,* ... 
2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be 
certain, and not arbitrary. 
3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, 
in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor 
to pay; 
V 
4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and 
to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, 
over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the 
state [WN, V. ii.b. 1-6; underlines mine]. 
To Stigler, these are not just preaching, but almost moral 
suasion. He contended that in the absence of knowledge of 
political forces, advice must often be bad and usually 
unpersuasive. "Why tell the sovereign that free trade is 
desirable, if one has no method of disarming the merchants and 
12 
manufacturers who have obtained the protectionist measures?••门 
Preaching is an extraordinarily slow and uncertain method of 
changing policy. It may sometimes lead to policies which 
endanger the society. Stigler was discontent with the normative 
literature before and after Smith wrote, and he found such a 
normative element in the most profound work of the Kircaldy 
professor, who was praised to have the jaundiced eye of a master 
economist to examine the most pompous and ceremonial of 
institutions and conduct. 
Moreover, in the essay "Economist as Preacher"", stigler 
implicitly referred the readers to Smith's preaching of 
efficiency. Under the heading "Preaching Efficiency" in this 
essay, he cited a major example which is Smith's attack on 
interferences with free trade and on mercantilism generally. 
Everyone who has read the Book IV of the Wealth of Nations 
recognises that Smith was an advocate of free trade: 、 
The natural effort of everv individual to better hie, own 
S r J r ' i f s T suffefr，to ~exert: itself ^ i t f f ^ e d o： ^nS 
security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone and 
- t h o二 any assistance, not only capable of L r r y i n g on ？he 
， c ^ e t j to wealth and prosperity, but of s u ™ L r n q a 
^undre^ impertinent obstructions with which t 【 r = i l 7 o^ 
= 二 : 〜 : o o often incumbers its operations ; t h o S h thJ 
”feet of these obstructions is alwavs more or less either 
p encroach upon its freedom ,。r to'diminish i t ^ L c i J i t v 
[quoted in Stigler 1982, p.307]. ts security 
The central policy conclusion that "under a system of perfectly 
free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and 
'' Stigler 1971b, p.243. 
“ Stigler 1982. 
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labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each"^' has 
been almost universally accepted by economists to this day. 
Stigler also gave another example, presumably reflecting the 
policy attitude of Smith: 
Many other examples, but none more important, of the 
economists, use of efficiency as the criterion for desirable 
economic policy could be given. The central element of the 
criticism of monopoly is that it reduces the efficiency of 
the use of resources [Stigler 1982, p.307]. _ 
Stigler continued to writer 
In Smith's time and for a few decades thereafter the 
argument for efficiency was embellished with a rhetoric of 
sacred and inviolable rights of natural liberty [Stiqler 
1982, p.308-9; emphasis mine] . _ ^ 
Stigler seemed to have been puzzled. In the footnote which 
followed immediately the above quotation, Stigler wrote: ' 
Thus Smith declares that prohibiting banks from issuing 
small bank notes is of course a violation of natural 
liberty, and yet it should be undertaken for the greater ‘ 
〒二g s ^ p t y ; see Wealth of Nations, I, p.324 [Stigler 
丄y^jz, p• Jo4J • 
Thus Smith not only preached efficiency, but it was the only 
job he did in the Wealth of Nations. But this is a profound 
misunderstanding of Smith's intellectual enterprise, probably due 
to the neglect of his Theory of Moral Sentiments and the reported 
Lectures on Jurisprudence. We shall deal with this issue in 
details in the following chapters. 
T a x a t i o n ， P r i n c i p l e s of Economy .nH 
1982! Sraffa ed.' iCambridge, 1951), quoted in Stigler 
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The above are the main points made by Stigler. However, in 
his essay he did not correct some of the purported failures of 
Smith. For example, Stigler did not give an explanation as to 
why primogeniture continued to exist; also he did not work out 
how Smith could have avoided explanation using pride and 
prejudice, or commented in detail the statement that absolute 
governments treated slaves more kindly than republican states. 
Such an controversial essay is bound to attract 
CO圓entators. In the next chapter we shall discuss the comments 
of E.G. West, from which we shall explore one of the most 
interesting aspects of Adam Smith's politics. 
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CHAPTER 2 E.G. WEST IN DEFENSE OF ADAM SMITH 
I 
Against Stigler's criticisms, E. G. West came to the rescue 
of Adam Smith. West is of special interest to us here because 
he has given a hint to the projected work of Adam Smith on 
jurisprudence, which can now be reconstructed from the reported 
notes of his jurisprudence lectures delivered in 1762-3 and 1766. 
It is one of.the tasks in this study to present the main themes 
of his projected work. 
West in his "Adam Smith's Economics of Polities'" recognized 
that in recent decades "politics" tends to be .discussed in three ‘ 
dimensions: the economics of the pre-constitutional stage of 
society, the economics of constitution making, and the economics 
of post-constitutional politics. The new interest of the second 
dimension has been stimulated by James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock, while the study of the third, concerning legislative 
tactics within given majority rules, given property rights, and 
given electorates, has been pioneered by Anthoy Downs, Kenneth 
Arrow and Duncan Black, and pushed to the limit by stigler. 
West's argument, though not being able to solve all the 
difficulties raised by Stigler, leads us to view the debate from 
^ . : .“Wes^, E.G., "Adam Smith's Economics of Politics" in 
》 a n d ^ M o d e r n Political E — 、 : , ed. by O'Driscoll： G? 
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anothei: perspective. It is simple: West contended that Smith's 
economics of politics was concerned primarily with the second 
dimension of politics, that of constitution making, while modern 
critics (e.g., Stigler) have got lost because they have 
concentrated on the third level, the economics of post-
constitutional politics. It is the job of this chapter to 
delineate his argument. West also traced out the historical 
context which related to Smith's fiscal advice to the French 
government { Stigler used this as an example to illustrate 
Smith's naive preaching and moral suasion^ showing that Smith,s 
concern for constitution making was not at all naive and 
romanticJ It is not our interest here to review this convincing 
plea to the charge. We shall leave it and other Stiglerian 
charges on the Wealth of Nations to the economic historian. 
工工 
West appealed to the extensive survey of historical evidence 
by Smith in the Wealth of Nations, and said that "one of the most 
important tasks of the constitution in Smith... was to secure 
individual l i b e r t y . H e inferred from Smith that 
[o]ne had to proceed by trial and error and to retain what 
experience showed to be valuable. For instance, the element 
y some separation of powers that had developed in the 
二rit^sh constitution Smith thought to be a w e l c o L f e a t u r f 
？ 二 ， a r y affairs had to take place in the Commons; th； 
己二jges were independent of the king; the Habeas Corpus Act 
was further security to individual freedom. The jury system 
‘ Stigler 1971b; p.244. 
3 West 1979, p.147-9. 
‘ West 1979, p.137. 
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was also a "friend of liberty" [West 1979, p.137]. 
West's interpretation was that Smithian liberty was best secured 
under the general rule of law with the aid of the principle of 
separation of powers in the government to avoid coercion. "In 
Smith's theory of justice most weight is placed on general 
laws . 
A fully democratic government, according to West, is not a 
view of Smith. He quoted Smith as saying: 
An incorporation not only renders them [the assemblies] 
necessary, but makes the act of the majority binding upon 
the whole. In a free trade an effectual combination 
cannot... last longer than every single trader continues of 
the same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a 
bye-law with proper penalties, which will limit the 
competition more effectually and more durablv than anv 
voluntary combination whatever [WN, I. x.c. 30]. 一 
However, Smith was not opposed to constitutional democracy 
altogether. "He was more concerned with the establishment of 
general laws of procedures that laid down permanent limits to the 
coercive powers of government than with the precise voting rules 
within it. 
West also compared Smith to the founding father of the 
American Constitution, which was a blend of republicanism and 
democracy. In a republic, if it is ruled by wise men, it can 
enjoy a liberty that is not threatened by tyrannical majorities. 
‘ West 1979,p.140. 
s West 1979, p.140. 
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West said that Smith ultimately relied heavily upon the guidance 
of the wise lawgiver: 
The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by 
humanity and benevolence, will respect the established 
powers and privileges even of individuals, and still more 
those of the great orders and societies into which the state 
is divided. Though he should consider some of them as in 
some measure abusive, he will content himself with 
moderating what he cannot annihilate without great violence. 
When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people 
by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue them 
by force. . . . He will accommodate, as well as he can, his 
public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices 
of the people, and will remedy, as well as he can, the 
inconveniences which may flow from the want of those 
regulations which the people are adverse to submit to. When 
he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will 
endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear 
[quoted in West 1979, p.141]. 
These findings led West to conclude that "it was the 
especially complex and arduous task of the legislator of 
constitutions that was the central focus of the economics of 
politics scattered through The Wealth of N a t i o n s . T h e 
following passage in the work reinforced West's belief: 
The leader of the successful party, however, if he has 
authority enough to prevail upon his own friends to act with 
proper temper and moderation(which he frequently does not) 
may sometimes render to his country a service much more 
essential and important than the greatest victories and the 
extensive conquests. He may re-establish and 彳m广ov。 
= 二 s t i t u t i ? ; ^ , and from the very doubtful and ambiguous 
二二 e r of the leader of a party, he may assume the 
T . n ^ t f , / I I character, that of the reformer and 
legislator of a great state; and, by the wisdom of his 
constitutions, secure the internal tranquility and happiness 
(^ f his fellow-citizens for many succeeding generations 
[quoted in West 1979, p.142; emphasis West's]. 
7 West 1979, p.141. 
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Thus smith understood the game fully, but he was more concerned 
with finding workable improvements in the rules of the game than 
with the tactics of the games by groups of special interest 
within the existing imperfect rules. 
Ill 
We now come to West's view on Stigler 丨 s thesis. West 
acknowledged that pragmatic legislative activity takes place 
therein within some form of constitution, and also the fact that 
in a weakening political constitution self-interest rather than 
public interest is a more explanatory behaviourial rule in 
politics. Stigler criticized Smith's failure to see "the self-
interest written upon the faces of politicians and 
constituencies", and the paradox is this: "if self-interest 
dominates the majority of men in all c o _ e r c i a l undertakings, why ’ 
not also in all their political undertakings?- However, West 
regar^^ec^ the "paradox丨丨 as basically at the post-constitutional 
level) Moreover, he definitely denied that this was a paradox 
at all. He explicitly defended Adam Smith because he believed 
that S.ith knew better than anybody that the self-interest of 
politicians and constituencies rendered all political 
undertakings to be co麵ercial ones. It was not Smith's interest 
to formulate a Stiglerian theory of regulation; his job was “ to 
stop Stigler-s nightmare world from developing.." This is 
probably an indirect answer to the first aspect of Stigler's 
criticisn^ Of Smith discussed in the Chapter 1. West continued 
‘ Stigler 1971b, p.237. 
‘ West 1979, p.144. 
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to argue: 
To do this [to stop Stigler"s nightmare world from 
developing] required that errors in the emerging 
constitution should be anticipated and checked bv those in 
^ position to do so. This is a normative position no doubt 
rmt an unavoidable one nevertheless [West 1979, p . 1 4 4 ] . 
This is probably the answer to the second aspect of Stigler's 
criticism! One can easily infer from West's argument that Smith 
was putting forth "general guidelines" for the making of a good 
constitution for a society; the function of a guideline is. by 
definition, normative. It is somehow, therefore, that Smith was 
not so much preaching efficiency as preaching such general 
guidelines. 
This is not the whole story of West's argument. His 
scrutinizing effort and perceptive analyses o.f Smith's passages . 
seem to render his answers above not that unconvincing. His 
examples referring to the modern world and his penetrating 
historical analysis seem to tell his reader that Smith's belief 
in bettering the constitution is not that naive and romantic. 
West quoted the following passage: 
martrarhi'^^h'i'l'l^^ the in Great Britain give to every 
m ? that he shall ennoy the fruits of his own l a b o n r H o 
The law, the general rules of just conduct, that secures 
individual liberty is hence the sole cause of the wealth of 
nations. From such a vision of the law, West's belief of the 
preoccupation of Adam Smith with the constitutional level was 
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further confirmed. While Stigler said that Smith need not have 
told the sovereign that free trade was desirable if he had no 
method of disarming the merchants and manufacturers who had 
obtained the protectionist measures, West argued that it was the 
improvement in the constitution which would serve as some method 
of disarming the merchants. Smith's address was to the “ 
custodians, the draftsmen, and the innovators of the 
constitution."- It is the other side of the coin not to 
deteriorate the constitution. Consider the following proposal 
of Adam Smith (preaching? moral suasion?) [quoted in West 1979, 
p.145-6]: 
二 m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s ] monopoly has so much increased the 
number of some particular tribes of them, that like an 
army, they have become f oV.fdfble th： 
leqislatur； 叩？^ occasions intimidate the 
importunity Of partial i n t e Y r e ^ t i f ^ 。 ^ ^ 
West's] . —‘“‘丄 V .丄工. 4 3 — 4,* emphasis 
such a law giver, being directed by an extensive view of the 
general good than to partial interest, is a "scarce good • 
Presumably Stigler must have considered this advice naive and 
romantic. However, neither did Stigler propose a method to 
disarm the merchants and manufacturers. If chance is allowed to 
West 1979, p,145. 
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play an important role in the fortune of economic actors〖t, why 
. d o e s Nature forbid such a chance of letting the most benevolent 
lawgivers with such a view of the general good to make a better 
society? Historical insights always serve as a tool for Smith's 
reasoning. His belief in public benevolence is no delusion: 
^he Count d'Avaux, the plenipotentiary of France, at the 
t g ^ y of Munster, would have been willing to sacrifice M s 
life (according to the Cardinal de L t z a m a ^ not 
overcredulous in the virtue of other people； in ordPr 
g二 / / s t o r e d by that treaty, the general"^ tranquillity o? 
， 厂 p ， . King William seems to have had a real zeal for thP 
liberty and independency of the greater part of 二二 
二ov^e^gn states of Europe; which, perhaps, m i ^ K be 〗 a S d 
st”ulated by his particular averslo； to France 
ft^te from which, during his time, that liberty' and 
independency were principally in d a n g e k Some s h a r f o f thP 
二，g spirit seems to have descended to the first iTinis^v 
of Queen Anne [TMS, VI. ii. 2,6]. 丄丄丄^ 匕^ ministry 
Moreover, West have asserted in his essay three corollaries from ‘ 
the Hobbesian view of nature, one of which read "(the legal 
frainework) once established, succeeding economic prosperity, 
provided it is not too unequally of unjustly distributed, will 
for all n^embers dramatically increase the opportunity costs of 
abandoning it and reverting to anarchy•“ This corollary, together 
with Smith's general rule of law, I propose, greatly assures us 
the possibility Of bettering the constitution of a society and 
the society itself inch by inch without receding. m fact, a 
better world tomorrow! West ‘ s rp； !^ r^^ -^ i ^  
^ ^ s real world example confirms the 
legitimacy of this reasoning: 
J. f r e ^ ' ^ i T o r E c 。 _ k Theory", 
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it would be difficult to describe Smith's advice to avoid 
monopolies as entirely unworkable or academic even 
• r ^ T J ^ he was not very explicit; for legislation s\nce h!s 
time has demonstrated its practicality. Antitrust ^aws at 
^east since Senator Sherman, have been grafted onto ‘the 
A m e r i ^ n constitution; for all its imperfections i t T s stJ?i 
arguable that one day they can be removed. MoreoieJ 
g g ^ ^ g n c e under monopoly legislation shows that ：：；^； 
^^ntrol of potential monopolies is normally easier than 
dismemberment of mature ones [West 1979, p.146] 
� 
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CHAPTER 3 A SUPPLEMENT TO WEST'S ARGUMENTS 
I 
Stigler's attitude towards moral suasion and preaching is 
so uncompromising as to deny almost the function of education. 
Recall the question he asked of Smith: why tell the sovereign 
that free trade is desirable if one has no method of disarming 
the i^erchants and manufacturers who have obtained the 
protectionist measures. Presumably Stigler regarded that it was 
too ideal to propose such a policy as free trade for the 
sovereign. However, Smith was not a believer in ideal, 
perfection, or even Utopia. The following quotations reflect 
Clearly either Stigler's carelessness in reading the Wealth of . 
Nations, or that his thought was preoccupied with ideas which 
were not altogether the same with those of Smith; they could not 
have CO画unicate>d with each other. Smith proposed: 
services ' a ^ e ' T t T i h w h e n discharged from the king's 
” 二 v : a。tf 
natural liberty of exerciqi nrr i ^ h • - Let the same 
Please be rest'ore/^r^ri^^hL^l^^^^ 
same manner as to soldiers and seainen- . o k '，』 t h e 
S 二 二 ' t h a Y a : � = t 
I 二 t ^ h " 二 。 二 二 f 。 二 二 ？ 。 二 二 二 , 
However, he immediately wrote in the next paragraph: 
二 二 二 .e 
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e二ect the an Oceana of Utopia should ever be established 
in It. Not only the prejudices of the public, but ^hat 
• i n S v l T ' i unconquerable, the private ^interests of L n ： 
individuals, irresistibly oppose it [WN, IV. ii. 43]. 
Consider also his remarks in another context about his attitude 
towards perfection: 
nation could not pirospeir v/ithout the eniovment of 
liberty and perfect justice, there ±s lot Tn thl 
g g W a nation which could ever have prospered [WN, i f 
Note that from the second quotation, we know West's was 
largely correct in his assertion that Smith knew better than 
anyone that self-interest, which was written upon the faces of 
politicians and constituencies. operated in all political 
undertakings in acquiring favourable regulations and exclusive 
privileges. Moreover, Smith, with his huge ainount of historical . 
and political knowledge, gave a role to prejudices and opinions 
in politics, and the mercantile system in particular, 
V 
As far as ideal, perfection and Utopia are concerned, Smith 
not only did not believe in these, but he explicitly criticized 
the so-called "men of syste." in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
When he discussed the nature of love of one's country, in ti.es 
Of public discontent, faction and disorder, these men of s y s t e . 
try to create a complete happiness in society.丨丨The leader of 
the discontented party seldom fail to hold out some plausible 
Plan Of reformation which, they pretend, will not only re.ove the 
inconveniences a n . relieve the distress W . i a t e l . complained 
Of, but will prevent, in all time corning, any return of the like 
26 
inconveniences and distresses • "i "The man of system. . . is often 
so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of 
government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any 
part of it- He goes on to establish it completely and in all its 
parts, without any regard either to the great interest, or to the 
strong prejudices which may oppose it. No doubt Smith was not 
one of them. He criticized the man of system, saying that his 
impulse to reform all at once the society was of the highest 
degree of arrogance. He was to erect his own judgment into the 
supreme standard of right and wrong, and to accommodate the 
fellow—citizens to him and not he to them. In fact, he was the 
only wise and worthy man in the commonwealth! 
工工 
In spite of Smith's negative attitude towards perfection and “ 
the man of system, nevertheless, he regarded some general, and 
even systematical idea of the perfection of policy and law as 
useful, if not essential. What he objected to was the men of' 
system, not the system itself. First of all, Smith considered 
it a natural tendency for men to construct speculative systems 
and to view them with beauty: 
The perfection of police, the extension of trade and 
manufactures, are noble and magnificent objects The 
contemplation of them pleases us, and we are interested in 
whatever can tend to advance them. Thev make part of the 
g r e ” system of government, and the wheels of the political 
machine seem to move with more harmony and ease bv means of 
them. We take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so 
t TMS, VI. ii.2.15. 
‘ TMS, VI. ii.2.17. 
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beautiful and grand a system, and we are uneasy till we 
remove any obstruction that can in the least disturb or 
encumber the regularity of its motions [TMS, IV.l. 11]. 
Second, these speculative systems, although sometimes lead men 
to the spirit of system, it can also lead to a genuine public 
spirit: 
is scare possible that a man should listen to a discourse 
Lof how a system works in his country] , and not feel himself 
animated to some degree of public spirit. He will, at least 
fo^ a moment, fell some desire to remove those obstructions 
and to put into motion so beautiful and so orderly a 
machine. Nothing tends so much to promote public spirit— as 
the study of politics, of the several systems of civil 
government Upon this account, political disquisitions, 
iJ： just, and reasonable, and practicable, are of all the 
of speculation the most useful. Even the weakest and 
i^e worst of them are not altogether without their utility 
Th，y serve at least to animate the public passions of men 
rouse them to seek out the means of promoting th4 
happiness of the society [TMS, IV. 2.1]. 
工 工 工 
Now it is time to go back to West's argument. His 
interpretation relies heavily on his belief that Smith was 
preoccupied with constitution making rather than the interest in 
post-constitutional tactics under a given constitution of a 
state. His references to "general rule of law and separation of 
powers in government", "general laws" to administer justice, and 
"general laws of procedures" that laid down permanent limit to 
the coercive powers of government,〗which he inferred from a 
close reading of the Wealth of Nations, were the main pillars of 
his attack (although Smith might regard these terms imprecise, 
as we shall see). While West was largely correct in his 
3 Chapter 2’ 工工. 
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interpretation, he was, however, defending Adam Smith by drawing 
references in terms of the literature of modern political 
economics- We don't know whether Stigler has rebuked that this 
was defense by anachronism, which is somehow one of his favourite 
arguments•彳 We are not interested in Stigler's response. What 
is surprising is that West could have done better if stigler 
should rebuke. And he need not have been so humble as to concede 
at the outset of、his essay that “ much of what follows is 
conjecture.-- It seems disappointing that while West have 
mentioned Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and his reported 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, he failed to draw enough evidences 
from the two books to strengthen his argument. The ideas of 
general laws and separation of power in government were not 
altogether anachronistic to Smith. On the contrary, he did have 
the idea of proposing general guidelines (principles) for the . 
making of constitution for a society long before his publication 
of the Wealth of Nations. It is one of our jobs of this study 
to reconstruct and delineate some of the most important 
substances, relevant to the discussion here, of Smith's planned 
work on the general principles and history of law and government. 
IV 
t 
farti丄 1 i J ^ number of these failures are due to incomplete 
Smith's f f i 二 I t would only be anachronistic t T S i S g 
二 = 。 failure to discuss the problem of the optimum investment 
f ^ t^e individual in the acquisition of knowLdge. " s t a l e r 
197 丄〒 p. 246; ••Anderson uses analyses of principal-aaen t 
p r o b e s , public goods, or transaction costs to justify 
^ f ^ i o n s , . This could be labelled defense bv〕anach:ronfsm " 
二 e r ^ 二 ” a m Smith and Public Choice: A Repl； to\ncierson , 
Hist, of Poll. Econ. vni 21 (1989) . Anaerson, 
5 West 1979, p.132. 
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It is difficult to present this part of Smith's whole 
intellectual enterprise, and surely cannot appreciate the unity 
of his thought that runs through all the three books, without 
surveying the content of his theory of natural justice. The 
neglect of this subtle unity, I think, largely explains why West 
regarded his conclusion as a conjecture. But before we engage 
in such an exposition, it is worthwhile to quote some important 
passages from the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of 
Nations as an introduction to the ensuing study. 
In the last paragraph at the end of the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Smith assured his readers that 
工 in another discourse endeavour to give an account 
• f general principles of law and governnfent, a n d i r S S . 
二 f e r e n t revolutions they have undergone in the different 
ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns 
= ， f i c e , but in what concerns police, revenue, and a r m ^ and 
whatever else is the object of law [TMS, VII. iv. 37]； 
And that these general princij^les 
ou^ht to run through, and be the foundation of laws of all 
nations [TMS, VII. iv. 37]. 〇R 己丄丄 
In Part Sixth of this work, to which it was added in the sixth 
editions, Smith gave a hint of his having the idea of such 
(general) principles: 
二 L ^ P 二 r C l i a P i f S p ^ ； ? 广 which those rules [the civil law and 
most important, but hitherto, perhaps, the c u l ^ i ^ t二, 
‘ Smith added this part in the sixth edition in 1790. 
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that of natural jurisprudence•••[TMS, VI. ii. intro. 1]. 
It should be remarked that the imperative "ought to" appears 
in both of the published works and the reported lecture notes of 
Smith. West got it right that Smith took his normative stance 
as to the function of these general p r i n c i p l e s H o w e v e r , these 
principles should not, and must not, be regarded as normative in 
character. Natural jurisprudence is a science, in the sense that 
it is a systematic knowledge, the content of which is going to 
be laid out in precise terms in the following chapters. West 
should not have worried that this "definite theme"〗 in Smith was 
his own conjecture. 
V 
Now the readers might have come to a puzzle. As natural 
jurisprudence is no doubt a system of knowledge, how could Smith 
have avoic^ed himself being a "man of system"? Indeed West has 
already hinted at the answer in some of the passages quoted in 
the Wealth of Nations. First of all, the wise "legislator" 
referred to by West in his essay has appeared in a number of 
cases in both of the published works of Smith. His natural 
jurisprudence, which is "the science of a legislator, whose 
deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which 
are always the same"\ was devotedly designed for him. Second, 
unlike the men of system, who "insist upon establishing, and upon 
7 Chapter 2, III. 
‘ West 1979, p.132. 
， WNr IV. ii. 39. 
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establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition"io, every 
thing which that system may seem to require, and who "consider 
the state as made for themselves, not themselves for the state'"、 
Smith's legislator, in contrast, 
will respect the established powers and privileges even of 
individuals, and still more those of the great orders and 
societies, into which the state is divided. Though he 
should consider some of them as in some measure abusive he 
will content himself with moderating, what he often caAnot 
annihilate without great violence. When he cannot ronauer 
the rooted prejudices of the people bv reason 'and 
persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue them bv force• 
[he] will accommodate, as well as he can, —his public 
arrangement to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the 
people; and will remedy as well as he can , thp 
inconveniences which may flow from the want of those 
regulations which the people are averse to submit to. When 
he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to 
二二 t G ^ e the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot 
^ 巧 S t system of laws, he will endeavour to 
0 1^1 the best that the people can bear [TMS, Vl.ii. 
^ • -L D J • 
West has also observed that this judgment is repeated in the 
Wealth of Nations. Referring to some welcome modification of the 
corn export bounty. Smith observed: 
W ^ h ajl its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of 
b L t Of the laws of Solon, that ？hough n o t ^ h e 
loest in Itself, it is the best which the interests 
prejudices, and temper of the times would admit of it ma； 
due tinie prepare the way for a better [WN i v ! 
Finally, Smith's realistic and gradual approach toward the 
reformation of a society is clearly seen from his contrast 
“ TMS, VI. ii. 2.18. 
u TMS, VI. ii. 2.18. 
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between the man of system and the man of real public spirit. The 
former seems 
二 叫 i n e that he can arrange the different members of a 
巧,，t society with as much ease as the hand arranges the 
different pieces upon a chess-board.... [But] that in the 
freat chess-board of human society, ever^ single piece Jas 
， v ^ P T i n p P” of motion of its own, altogether d?ffe?e二 
i'l 2 might choose to i.press upon 
% 
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CHAPTER 4 THE SPECTATOR PRINCIPI^E AND THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 
工 
What gives the works of Adam Smith a unified theme is the 
spectator theory treated in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Adam Smith scholars now recognize, almost unanimously, that there 
is not any inconsistency between the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
and the Wealth of Nations. There is no such creature as the ’， 
Adam Smith Problem-. Many of them have argued that one cannot 
fully understand Smith without referring to his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. In the rest of the study we shall see how the 
principle of sympathy and the spectator theory run through the 
three books, i.e.. the two mentioned above, and his reported ‘ 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, although one cannot find any explicit 
mention of the terms sympathy and spectator in the Wealth of 
Nations. • 
According to Smith, all moral judgments are based upon an 
imaginary change of situation, whereby the individual judging 
imagines to place himself in the situation of the individual 
:iudged of, and feels to soi.e extent as his own the sentiments and 
passions of the latter. This participation in the feelings of 
‘ others is- sympathy. The individual judging is known as the 
spectator of the situation of the individual judged of, and he 
W N .〖 Refer to TMS, Introduction, 2 (b): Relation of TMS to 
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sympathizes with the sentiments and passions of the latter, or 
simply, he sympathizes with the latter. 
Now, if the original passions (e.g., resentment) of the 
person principally concerned are in "perfect concord with the 
sympathetic emotions of the spectator," then these original 
passions appear to the spectator just and "proper", and 
"suitable" to the causes which excite these passions'. 
Consider the following event. Someone has done injuries 
(the cause) to me, which provoke my resentment (the passion 
excited by this cause) . Now there is a third person (the 
spectator) observing this event, and is going to put himself into 
my situation so as to judge my resentment. If his resentment 
(the sympathetic emotion) is in perfect . concord with my , 
resentment, or in other words, if he resents the injuries that 
have been done to me precisely as I do, then he necessarily 
approves of my resentment. Smith, 'therefore, concluded: 
To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as 
sj^itable to their objects [causes], is the same thing as to 
observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to 
a p 广 v e of them as such, is the same thing a； to oTserve 
2 意 1 广 not entirely sympathize with them [TMS, I. 
Note that in the above example "to approve of my resentment" is 
equivalent to saying that my resentment is "proper", or my 
resentment (the passion) is "suitable" to the injuries (the 
cause, or the object). Therefore, the question of propriety of 
2 TMS, I . I . 3 . 1 . 
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a passion is to find out the suitability of the passion to the 
cause which excites it. Smith thus defined propriety or 
impropriety to consist of 
the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or 
disproportion which the affection [passion] seems to bear 
to the cause or object which excites it [TMS, I. i. 3.6]• 
In the previous example, if the spectator, after putting himself 
into my situation, finds that my resentment is too excessive, 
that the injuries are not so harmful as to justify such a large 
resentment, then the third person necessarily regards my 
resentment (the passion) as improper, and, therefore, necessarily 
disapprove this resentment, because it does not bear in 
proportion to the injuries (the cause) , or what is the same 




We have discussed how a spectator comes to approve or 
disapprove of a passion or sentiment in his reaction to the 
situation of the individual judged of. Of all the passions and 
sentiments it is resentment which is central to the discussion 
of the virtue of justice and beneficence. We shall try to 
explain the basic element in Smith's theory of justice'. 
Smith's theory of justice is based on his perceptive 
analysis of human nature. First he observed that sympathy or 
The exposition here is based on Haakonssen [1981] • 
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"fellow—feeling" is universal to mankind. “ The great ruffian, 
the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not 
altogether without i t . S e c o n d , the happiness of man is only 
"a trifle" whereas the possible depths of misery are "immense and 
prodigious". This is our everyday observation. Hence Smith 
conclude: 
Pain...., whether of mind and body, is a more pungent 
sensation than pleasure [TMS, I. iii. 1.7—8]. 
Third, as pain makes a greater impression than pleasure upon the 
subjects of these sensations, so there is a difference in the 
sympathetic communication of the two. It is our everyday 
experience that we always participate to at least some degree, 
not to say in full, in another‘s sorrowful situation; whereas we 
do not always perceive the joy and happiness of others, or we ‘ 
sympathize with their joy and happiness in a very limited degree, 
not to say none. Therefore, Smith asserted: 
our sympathy with sorrow is ••• more universal, than that 
with joy [TMS, I. iii. 1.2]• 
The conclusion that pain and misery are more pungently felt 
than pleasure and happiness, and that sympathy with the former 
is more universal, constitute Smith's distinction of the nature 
of justice and beneficence. He compared beneficence and justice 
through a comparison of the reactions to the lack of either. 
The man who does not show beneficence can at most be the "the 
object of hatred not of resentment, a passion which is never 
‘ T M S ,工 . i . 1.1. 
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properly called forth but by the actions which tend to do real 
and positive hurt to some particular p e r s o n s . A c c o r d i n g to 
Smith, hatred, unlike resentment, would not lead to punishment 
of the object. Resentment, however, must deserves punishment: 
The sentiment.•• which most immediately and directly prompts 
us to punish, is resentment [TMS, II. i- 1.2]. 
that action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears 
to be the proper and approved object of resentment [TMS, II. 
i • 1 • 3 J • 
Note that these words "immediately and directly prompts" convey 
a sense of spontaneity. With regard to justice, Smith wrote: 
another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the 
freedom of our own wills, which mav be extorted bv force 
and of which the violation exposes to resentment, and 
consequently to punishment. This virtue is justice. the 
violation of justice is injury: it does .real positive hurt , 
^o some particular persons, from motives which are naturally 
disapproved of. It is. therefore, the proper object of 
resentment, and of punishment, which is the natural 
consequence of resentment [TMS, II. ii. 1.5]• 
In terms of the spectator theory, the lack of justice (cause or 
object) excites the resentment (the passion) of the person 
principally concerned. Any impartial or fair spectator, after 
sympathizing with that person, necessarily approves of his 
resentment. The lack of justice, being the cause or object of 
this resentment which is approved of by any impartial spectator, 
necessarily deserves punishment immediately. However, the mere 
lack of beneficence, being the cause or object of hatred, would 
not lead to punishment, although this passion is approved of by 
‘ TMS, II. ii. 1.3. 
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the impartial spectator. 
Any impartial spectator would approve of the reaction to the 
lack of justice as proper. It is often that the sympathetic 
resentment is so strong as to lead to action in the form of 
assistance to the injured in his pursuit of punishment. 
Smith called justice the "negative" virtue and all other 
social virtues the "positive" virtues. This distinction consists 
in 
， ” we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to 丨 
to justice, then agreeably to friendship? 
charity or generosity; that the practice of these last- ( 
二enti，ed virtues seems to be left in some ^ a s S S t o l S r ^ 
？ ^ b e f n T ' but that, so.ehow or other, we feel ourselves 1 
t? be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged to thP 
observation of justice [TMS,工工.ii. 1.5] . ^ ' to the , 
‘ i 
• I 
We can also see the difference between the positive and the 丨丨 
negative in the situation that they are done: ^ 
V J 
doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice 
二 = 二 merits upon that account, all approbation which i； 
？ 二 。 二 二 t 。 ： = 二 二 广 L ? 二 S ， 
SLr^I^^r if.〕i”S9产e by sitting still 'an/'lo.n'g'nothing 
such a principle of justice operates in every society and 
governs the conducts of men. They gradually come to Know which 
conducts are to be avoided so as not to provoke the resentment 
of the impartial spectator. The general rules of justice thereby 
evolve. 
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Smith always stressed that the general rules of justice are 
absolutely precise, while the rules of other positive virtues are 
unclear: 
The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and 
admit of no exceptions or modifications but such as may be 
ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, and which 
generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with 
them [TMS, III. 6.10]. 
The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of 
grammar； the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which 
critics lay down for the attainment of what is sublime and 
elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and 
indispensable. The other, are loose, vague and 
indeterminate [TMS, I工工.6.11]. 
Smith never spelt out his explanation, but Haakonssen' suggests 
that the rules of justice are precise simply because they are 
derived from the spectator reactions which are unusually 
"universal", namely the "pungent" feeling of sympathetic 
、 resentment occasioned by "real and positive hurt". The clarity 
and accuracy are transferred in the following chain: the action 
(negative: hurting), the reaction (resentment and punishment), 
the spectator-reaction through sympathy (sympathetic resentment 
and assistance in punishing), and the general rules arising from 
spectator reactions. 
The above are the basic elements of the theory of justice 
of Smith, and is the core of his natural jurisprudence. It is 
the precision and accuracy of justice that render his natural 
® Haakonssen [1981], p.86. 
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jurisprudence a science, "of all the sciences by far the most 
impoirtant, but hitherto, perhaps, the least cultivated"?. 
1 TMS, VI. ii. intro.l. 
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CHAPTER 5 JUSTICE IS THE FOUNDATION OF LAW 
工 
We have already mentioned that West have almost got it right 
that Smith mostly concerned himself with the "general rule of 
law". However, besides his failure to draw evidences from the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments that Smith had proposed to write on 
the subject of natural jurisprudence, West‘s argument has at 
least the following two weaknesses: first, the term "general rule 
of law" as a guidance for a wise lawgiver is imprecise,, second, 
from the general attitude of West towards the treatment of Smith 
in his essay, he, like some other scholars, has interpreted that . 
the "general laws" of Smith was to protect property: "In Smith‘s 
theory of justice most weight is placed on general laws. And the 
basic function of these was to protect property.'" While this 
interpretation is largely correct, it altogether sounds like that 
the origin of laws, or "general laws", is for the protection of 
property alone. This is not the whole story丨 The answers to 
these problems are inseparable. According to Adam Smith, 
"General rule of law" as a general principle for a wise lawgiver 
or legislator concerns justice, which is precise, and justice is 
and ought to be the origin of all laws. This chapter explains 
how justice is the origin of all laws. The next chapter explains 
how justice ought to be the foundation of all laws. 
t West 1979, p.139. 
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II 
To Smith, natural jurisprudence deals with four branches of 
laws, which constitute the foundation of design of every 
government. They are Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms. "The 
first and chief design of every system of government is to 
maintain justice; to prevent the members of a society from 
encroaching on one another property, or seizing what is not theiir 
own. The design here is to give each one the secure and peacable 
possession of his own property." i have to stress once more 
that this statement should not be taken as that the origin of 
laws of justice are to protect property, as we shall see. When 
internal peace or peace within doors is secured, the next thing 
the government should do is to promote the opulence of the state.‘ 
"This produces what we call police J" Smith was reported to 
consider whatever regulations that were made with respect to 
trade, Commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country 
belonged to the Police. It will be the aim of the next chapter 
to explain why police and justice are inter-related. Government 
cannot be supported without some expense, and it would next be 
considered in what manner this expense of government should be 
borne. The sum levied to defray this expense is the Revenue of 
the government. Besides these three considerations, it must also 
be necessary to have some means of protecting the state from 
foreign encroachments. "Though the peace within doors be never 
2 LJ (A), i.l. 
‘ LJ (A), i. 2. 
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so firmly established, yet if there be no security from injuries 
from without the property of individuals cannot be secure [d] J" 
So the fourth objective of a civil government is Arms, the 
arrangement of the military. Haakonssen suggests that the 
arrangement of the revenue system concerns justice because it 
involves forcible infringement of liberty, privacy and property 
of individuals, although Smith never explicitly spelt this out'. 
As to Arms, or defence, Smith clearly said that without it the 
property of the individuals was in vain. This is rightly 
confirmed by the fact that in the Wealth of Nations, defence is 
of the first priority for the role of the state-. 
The above are a brief description of the four branches of 
natural jurisprudence, Note that the four above can be viewed 
as Smith‘s primary concern for justice and arms, i.e. the peace “ 
within and without the doors of the state. It could also be 
interpreted that Smith's ultimate concern was the viability of 
a society, of a viable publib order. From this perspective, 
Stigler‘s puzzle is largely solved^. We shall return to this 
issue in the next chapter. 
Since it is not our task to review all the four branches of 
laws, we shall concentrate our attention only on the relevant 
4 LJ (A), i. 7. 
^ Haakonssen [1981], p.96. 
6 W N ,工 V . ix. 51. 
7 Chapter 1, IV. 
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parts of Justice in this chapter. This is sufficient to achieve 
the objective of the present study. 
Ill 
It has already been mentioned that Smith planned to write 
a book on natural jurisprudence, which was concerned with the 
general principles on which laws and governments ought to be 
founded and directed. Although he did not yet have time to carry 
out such a project, one of the most important ideas relevant to 
such a work has been spelt out in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Consider the following passage: 
The wisdom of every state or commonwealth endeavour, as well 
as it can, to employ the force of the society to restrain 
those who are subject to its authority, from hurting or 
disturbing the happiness of one another. The rules which 
It establishes for this purpose, constitute the civil and 
criminal law of each particular state or country [TMS, VI ‘ 
ii• intro. 2]. • ‘ 
At least three things can be inferred from the above passage. 
First, hurting or disturbing the happiness of one another, or 
what comes to be the same thing, injustice, is to be restraineci. 
Second, the phrase "the wisdom of every state or commonwealth", 
from every context of all his works one finds in Smith, conveys 
subtly that the rules to restrain injustice, or simply the rules 
of justice, are not established by the state because they are 
useful, or have "utility"丨 to the general public, as Smith used 
this term; they are altogether established because of the 
spectator reactions to concrete situations involving unjust 
^ R e f e ^ t o Haakonssen [1981], Chapter 3, section 7, and 
Chapter 4, section 2. ‘ 
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conducts. The spectator simply is not conscious of the utility 
of such future established rules: namely the protection of 
individuals from hurting or disturbing by o t h e r s . These rules 
are unintended consequences of the spectators' who are led by an 
"invisible hand" to promote ends ；vhich are no part of their 
i n t e n t i o n ^ Third, these rules of justice are the foundation of 
civil and criminal law of each state or country. Justice is, 
therefore, the foundation of law. 
From the above discussion, laws evolve almost, as it were, 
spontaneously. This is because the accuracy and precision of 
justice imply the spontaneity of the evolution of these general 
rules of justice, and society almost spontaneously enforces the 
rules. Here we see the natural philosophy of Adam Smith finds 
expression in jurisprudence just as in economics. -
IV 
Before discussing the general principles behind the private 
and public laws, we have to clarify the relationship between the 
concepts: right, injury and justice. The three are actually the 
three faces of the same concept. Right and justice are dependent 
upon the concept of injury: "Justice is violated whenever one is 
deprived of what he had a right to and could justly demand from 
others, or rather, when we do him any injury or hurt without a 
c a u s e .” Therefore, the rules of justice define our rights, and 
rights are deprived when we are injured, 
• Refer to TMS, IV. 1.10. 
to LJ (A) , i. 9. 
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To Smith, justice may be violated, man may be injured, in 
the following three respects: "1st, he may be injured as a man; 
2dlY, as a member of a family; 3dly, as a citizen or member of 
a state.:"' In these three respects, Smith classified his 
discussion in three categories: private law, domestic law and 
public law. The first category is divided into three, for we may 
be injured in our person (bodily harm or confinement) , or in our 
reputation, or in our property. Domestic law is concerned with 
the injuries which can occur in relations between spouses, 
parents and children, and masters and servants. Public law is 
concerned with citizens' right against the sovereign and the 
sovereign's rights against the citizens. We shall concern 
ourselves with only one area of each of the three categories, 
namely, property acquired by occupation (private law), spouses 
(domestic law) and citizens' right against the sovereign (public 
law). 
V 
We now discuss property acquired by occupationiz • Imagine 
that everybody recognizes the possession of an individual as the 
property of that individual, and inherently will not violate his 
right, that is, will not take hold of his possession. Then, no 
property law of occupation exists； there is simply no such a 
conception of law. Therefore, property law comes to exist simply 
because someone violates the right to possession of others, wants 
u LJ (A), i. 10. 
tz LJ (A), i. 25-63; LJ (B) , 149-52. 
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to take hold of other' s possessions as his own. Given that 
someone wants to violate this right, the question that Smith 
would ask is how property law of occupation comes to exist. How 
is it that the bare possession of an object comes to give us an 
exclusive right to it? What is the foundation or origin of this 
property law? To use Smith's example^], how it is that a man by 
pulling an apple should be imagined to have a right to that apple 
and that an injury should be conceived to be done when this apple 
is taken away from him. The answer is that the spectator would 
justify the first possessor in defending and even in avenging 
himself when injured. The cause of this sympathy is that the 
spectator may form a reasonable expectation that the first 
possessor of the fruit would use it in what manner he pleases. 
This expectation justifies the possessor in the mind of the 
spectator when he defends himself against one who deprives him • 
of what he has acquired, and when he endeavours to recover it by 
force. This reasonable expectation therefore furnishes the 
ground on which the right of property is acquired by occupation^^. 
This spectator argument, and hence justice, is the founciation of 
property law by occupation. 
When we consider marriage law, the spectator argument also 
applies. Consider the problem of fidelity^^ of the wife to the 
husband. "The breach of chastity is the greatest of offenses.''” 
LJ (A) , i. 35. 
LJ (A), i. 37. 
ts LJ (A) , iii. 6 — 237 LJ (B), 102-105. 
LJ (B) , 102. 
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Why? Smith contended that this law became established not 
because it was useful to the society (i.e. it has utility) in the 
sense that the establishment of such a law was directed to a 
definite objective which was good to society. Therefore, 
although Smith knew the fact that "spurious children may be 
introduced into the family and come to the succession instead of 
lawful ones"口， he nevertheless asserted that 
[this] real utility however is not the proper foundation of 
the crime [LJ(B), 102]. 
He therefore put forth his spectator reasonings 
The indignation of the public against the wife arises from 
their sympathy with the jealousy of the husband, and 
accordingly they are disposed to resent and punish it. The 
sentiment of jealousy is not chiefly founded, or rather not 
at all, upon the idea of a spurious offspring [LJ(B) , 103] • 
This is how infidelity came to be a crime. This idea is also ‘ 
found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
breaches of the rules of chastity... in all grosser 
instances are real breaches of the rules of justibe [TMS, 
VII, iv.21]. 
It is important to note that Smith explicitly rejected the 
utility foundation of law, unless without this utility the 
viability of the public order is seriously affected. We shall 
return to this point in the next chapter. 
Concerning the infidelity of the husband to the wife, 
however, this was not accounted as adultery. The reason, 
“ LJ (B), 103. 
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according to Smith, was that it was men who made the laws with 
respect of this; they generally would be inclineci to curb the 
women as much as possible and gave themselves the more 
indulgence. However, under the influence of the clergy the sexes 
"were put altogether on an equal footing in almost all 
r e s p e c t s . '…T h e clergy were not allowed to marry and therefore 
"were much more impartial j u d g e s . H o w e v e r , Smith continued to 
explain in his lecture that as the husband had a considerable 
superiority to the wife, the injury done to his honour and love 
would be more grievous: 
injuries done to a superior by an inferior are more sensibly 
felt than those which are done to an inferior by one whom 
they look upon as above them [LJ(A) , iii. 16]. 
Therefore, in this respect the wife was still "punished with the 
greatest ignominy" [LJ(B) , 148] . The above remark, I think, 
clearly shows that in Smith‘s mind the spectator sympathetic 
resentment is the only foundation of law. The severity of the 
crime and hence the degree of punishment altogether depended on 
the spectator resentment, in spite of the contrivance of the 
clergy to put the two cases on an equal footing. 
We are going to discuss Smith's view on public law^^. It 
interests us here because it directly relates to West‘s reference 
to the separation of powers to limit the coercion of government, 
LJ (A) , iii. 16. 
LJ (A) , iii.16. 
2。 LJ (A), V. 102-49; LJ (B), 91-9. 
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or in smith words, the injury of a man as a citizen. This part 
of the public law is concerned with rights of citizens against 
their sovereign. Let us see how Smith explained the general 
principle behind. 
Smith began with an intriguing statement: 
The nature of this branch of public law... is such that we 
can not pretend to such precision in it as in the private 
laws amongst s u b j e c t s… [ L J (A), v.102]. 
We have already seen that the general principles behind private 
law and domestic law are precise mainly because of the precision 
of spectator argument and hence the theory of justice. It can 
be inferred from the passages in the Lectures that Smith regarded 
most of the matters pertaining to this branch of public law as 
difficult to ascertain to be right or wrong: 
All disputes of this sort have been decideci by force and 
violence. If the sovereign got the better of the subjects, 
、 then thev were condemned as traitors and rebels; and if the 
subjects^ have got the better of the sovereign, he is 
declared to be a tvrant and oppressor not to be endured. 
Sometimes the decision has been right, and sometimes wrong 
[LJ (A) , V.104]. 
工 think that it is this nature of matters in this branch of law 
that makes the spectators (difficult to go along with situations 
concerned; the spectators cannot easily decide what is right or 
wrong. Therefore, general rules of justice do not evolve, let 
alone laws to define the limits of the sovereign power: 
The precise limits have been little considered and are very 
difficult to ascertain to which the power of the sovereign 
extends There are without doubt certain limits, but no 
one has yet considered them with the same candour and 
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composure as a court does the private affairs of individuals 
[LJ(A), V.103]. 
However, Smith maintained that sometimes the sovereign would go 
so extreme that "there are still some things which must be 
unlawful even for the s o v e r e i g n : 
But whatever be the foundation of the obedience of the 
subjects, there are some things which it is unlawful for thp 
sovereign to attempt and entitle the subjects to make 
resistance. Some certain degrees of absurdity and outrage, 
either in a single person or an assembly, will entirely 
destroy all their claim of obedience All agree that 
lunacy, nonage [minority], or ideotism entirelv destrov the 
authority of a prince [LJ(A), v.125] “ _ 
There are degrees of absurdity and impropriety in the conduct of 
a sovereign which "entitle the subjects to resistance in the eyes 
of every unprejudiced person.":〗 It is clear from this statement , 
that sometimes. when the sovereign goes to extremes, an 
unprejudiced spectator can go along with the situation concerned. 
However, it seems in Smith's mind that although the 
sovereign may be resisted, it is still difficult to ascertain 
what absurdity and impropriety in conduct or abuse of the 
sovereign justify resistance: 
二It the sovereign may be resisted, it can't be said 
that there is any regular authority for so doing. The 
'' LJ (A) , V . 104. 
u . Smith asserted that authority and utility are the onlv 
principles that underlie the obedience of the subiacts U 
(A), V. 119-24 and 129-32; LJ (B), 12-5. su⑴ects. LJ 
“ LJ (A), V.126. 
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property, life, and liberty of the subject are in some 
measure in his power； nor is it or can it be ascertain what 
abuses justify resistance. No laws, no judges, have or can 
ascertain this matter, nor form any precedents whereby we 
may judge [LJ(A), v.138]. 
It could be inferred, I think, from the above passage that Smith 
might have not well formulated his ideas in this branch of public 
law. The reason is as follows: we do not know whether Smith 
said that "there is no authority for so doing" because the 
matters were difficult to know right or wrong, or because the 
sovereign power is absolute. It is because Smith always stressed 
that the sovereign power is absolute: "j 
».• 
h 
There is no doubt then but the power of the king may be 
resisted; but the question is, when is it lawful or 
allowable to resist the power of the king and Parliament. ；I 
They would never have any thoughts of making any laws which .j 
should tell us that, when they went beyond such and such 
limits, the people were not bound to obey them but might ， \ 
resist. That they should do this cannot be imagined. In I 
whatever place there is a sovereign, from the very nature 
of things the power must be absolute； no power regularly 1 
established of calling the sovereign to account, as the 
sovereign has an undoubted title to the obedience of the 丨 
subjects [LJ (A), v.113-4]. , li 
For if what we called the summa potestas was liable to be 
called to account by any man, any body of the people or the 
whole people, this person or body would be the summa 
potestas, and if this again was under the authority of 
another, this would be the summa potestas. So that we "must 
always end in some body who have a power liable to no 
control from a regular power [LJ (A), v.140]. 
The problem is that if the power of the sovereign is absolute, 
then the discussion of the spectator argument seems to be 
redundant, because it is the difficulty to ascertain what is 
right or wrong. But if there is the existence of the institution 
of separation of power into the executive, judicial and 
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legislative branches, it is not so. Consider the following 
passage: 
with regard to governments where the supreme power is 
• (iiviLded amongst different persons [the executive, judicial, 
and legislative] there is no great difficulty in 
ascertaining when any one transgresses the limits of his 
power [LJ (A), v.138]. 
If one branch trespasses on the area entrusted to one of the 
others, this will constitute an infringement of the right of the 
latter, which can therefore "with all justice and equity"^^ defend 
its right: 
> I I 
i 
when the sovereign power is divided amongst different hands, 
tho it is impossible to say how far the whole sovereign 
power conjoined may go, it is easy to ascertain when any of 1 
those amongst whom it is divided go beyond their lawful I 
bounds ； for this is the case whenever any one of them ] 
attempts to exercise the power which belongs to 
another.... [LJ (A), v.141] . ’ j 
t ‘ 
‘丨丨 
t . . 
；I 
Even though Adam Smith did not explain how the separation of ji 
power came to exist, but once it was instituted, the spectator ：! 
theory was there, just as in the case of private or domestic 
laws. After all, the Lecture Notes were not written by Smith, 
nor are these well formulated final ideas of him about natural 
jurisprudence. It is not our task to drill deeply into this 
issue. The only thing we need to heed is that Adam Smith always 
discussed laws from the perspective of spectator theory, and 
hence the theory of justice, which constituted the core of his 
general principles on which laws and governments were and ought 
to be founded. 
'' LJ (B) ,98. 
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CHAPTER 6 JUSTICE OUGHT TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF LAW 
I 
So far we have only established that justice is the 
foundation of laws and governments. In this chapter, we shall 
further see how justice ought to be their foundation. Smith 
began in the two Lecture Notes with the following statements: 
» I j 
Jurisprudence is the theory of the rules by which civil 
governments ought to be founded [LJ(A), i.l]. 
Jurisprudence is that science which inquires into the t 
general principles which ought to be the foundation of the ] 
laws of nations [LJ (B),1]. ‘ 
费 
t； 
It seems to Smith that the "ought to" question is much more 力 
important than the "is" one. In order to see how the first 广’ 
一， 
question is a concern to Smith, we have first to see what Smith J 
meant by "laws of justice" and "laws of police". 
We have already seen that laws of justice evolve from the 
general rules of justice, which are the unintended consequences 
derived from the standpoint of the impartial spectators in 
concrete situations at a given historical time. When we heard 
〇f Smith saying "it is natural", "it is arising from nature", 
"being contrary to nature" or "founded on natural reason", we can 
infer that the spectator principle is present. When we come to 
the "laws of police", Smith never spelt it out exactly what they 
55 
meant, although he said: 
Whatever regulations are made with respect to the t r a d e , 
commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country are 
considered as belonging to the police [LJ (A), 土.之]. 
In spite of this passage, one can easily infer from Smith's 
discussion of various branches of laws that "laws of police", in 
contrast to "laws of justice", are laws or regulations 
established for particular purposes, not only those concerning 
the opulence of a country. Remember that laws of justice are 
"unintended" rules based on natural reason. 
II 
Everyone familiar with the Wealth of Nations knows that 
Smith always criticized numerous "absurd regulations". But under 
what basis did Smith make such criLticisni? If we go through his , 
Lecture Notes reported by his students, we can easily infer from 
many passages that Smith criticized these absurd regulations or 
of police not so much because they were harmful to the 
society, (e.g. inefficient allocation of resources), but because 
they were established in contrary to nature or natural reasons. 
This understanding of Smith sheds light on his concern for the 
"ought to" question. It is simply that laws ought to be founded 
on natural reasons, not contrary to nature, and be based on 
justice; otherwise, these laws should be condemned and 
criticized. From this perspective, Stigler‘s misunderstanding 
of Smith laid out in Chapter 1 is easily clarified, and we shall 
deal with it at the end of this chapter. 
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Don ‘ t forget that Smith ‘ s promise of writing a book on 
natural juirisprudence was made known at the end of the last 
chapter of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is interesting to 
note that the above idea of criticizing positive law, and hence 
the manner of the normative function of jurisprudence, had 
already been laid out in the Theory: 
Every system of positive law may be regarded as a more o r 
less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural 
jurisprudence, or towards an enumeration of the particular 
rules of justice [TMS, VII. iv. 36]. 
In no country do the decisions of positive law coincide 
exactly, in every case, with the rules which the natural 
sense of justice would dictate. Systems of positive law, 
therefore, though they deserve the greatest authority as the 
records of the sentiments of mankind in different ages and 
nations, yet can never be regarded as accurate systems of 
the rules of natural justice [TMS, VI. iv. 36]. 
Therefore, when the positive law coincides exactly with "natural , 
rules of justice, or when the natural rules of justice are 
independent of all positive institution"^, the "ought to" 
function of natural jurisprudence is、achieved. 
工 工 工 
We should now come to look at some examples of how Smith 
regarded certain laws as unjust in spectator terms. The first 
area we examine is the property law. With regard to wild 
animals, Smith argued that they "must continue common [i.e. to 
be owned by everyone] by the rules of equity"〗. This is most 
agreeable to reason: 
t TMS, VII. iv. 37. 
2 LJ (A), i. 53. 
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By the civil law and the constitutions of most countries 
in ancient times, game was considered as being free to 
everyone. And this certainly is what is most agreeable to 
reason [LJ(A), i. 54]. 
• However, since the feudal government was established, many 
statutes were created to bring wild animals as property for the 
king and his nobles. For example, "no one should kill 
game. . . unless licensed by the owners of the land. Smith saici 
that ” [there] can be no reason in equity given for this 
constitution"^ and his reason was that everyone could hunt these 
animals without any injury being done to others: 
If one did the proprietor damage he might be obliged to 
give him satisfaction, but when there is no danger of damage 
any one might catch game as well as the proprietor of the 
ground [LJ(A), i . 55-56]. 
This is the concept of injury, and hence justice. The spectator 
principle is therefore working. Smith condemned these statutes 
from the view point of the spectator theory; ^they were contrary 
to (natural) reason. We should note here that Smith's conclusion 
in this case is contrary to that of the modern property right 
tradition, claiming that private property of wild animals leads 
to efficient use of them. Smith was not, therefore, concerned 
so much for efficiency as for justice. 
Another interesting example is laws concerning punishment. 
Concerning the punishment for theft, spectator theory still 
3 LJ (A), i. 55. 
< LJ (A), i. 55. 
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applied： 
The punishment which is commonly inflicted on theft is 
certainly not at all proportionable to the crime. It is 
greatly too severe, and such as the resentment of the 
injured person would not require [LJ(A), ii.l49]. 
Theft appears naturally not to merit a very high punishment； 
it is a despicable crime and such as raises our contempt 
rather than any high resentment. ——It is however punished 
capitally in most countries of Europe [LJ(A), ii.147-148]. 
It has also to be noted that Smith's argument here is totally 
contrary to those in the modern literatur^e on optimal enforcement 
of law.‘ Again, his discussion of law was not from an efficiency 
view point. 
Although the spectator principle ought to be the foundation 
of all laws, it was not necessarily so when the viability of the 
society was seriously affected. Consider the case of the , 
sentinel who under military law was sentenced to death for 
falling asleep while on guard: 
This is intirely founded on the consideration of the publick 
good [LJ (A), ii.92]. 
the preservation of an individual is inconsistent with the 
safety of a multitude [TMS, II. ii. 3.11]. 
We have mentioned that defence and justice are essential to the 
viability of a society. That the case for defence we have 
already seen J For that of justice: 
‘ Refer to Polinsky, A. M., An Introduction to Law and 
Economics, Boston: Little, Brown, 1983. 
s Chapter 5, II. 
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the public magistrate is under a necessity of employing the 
power of the commonwealth to enforce the practice of this 
virtue [justice]. Without this precaution, civil society 
would become a scene of bloodshed and disorder... [TMS, 
VII.iv.36]. 
Therefore, when there are cases in which natural justice is in 
conflict with a viable public order, natural justice should be 
restrained. This view solves Stigler‘s puzzle concerning the 
prohibition of banks from issuing small bank notes:‘ 
to restrain a banker from issuing such notes, when all his 
neighbours are willing to accept of them, is a manifest 
violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper 
business of law, not to infringe, but to support. Such 
regulations may no doubt, be considered as in some respect 
a violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the 
natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger 
the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, 
restrained by the laws, of all governments [WN,工工.ii.94]. 
We should not forget that in the Wealth of Nations defense was 
to be ranked above the admiiiistration of justice. ^  
IV 
We now come to the last part of this chapter. This is the 
view of Smith on exclusive privileges. It is so clear from the 
relevant passages in both Lecture Notes that Smith criticized 
most of these privileges, not from the view of efficiency, but 
from that of natural justice. He compared the exclusive 
privileges of the right to inheritance and those of monopolies 
and all privileges: 
7 Chapter 1, IV. 
‘ WN, IV. ix. 51. 
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the right of i n h e r i t a n c e • is not a creature of civil law 
but arises from nature. The heir. . . h a s a privilege of 
demanding what belong to the deceased, and after he is 
admitted heir it is his real property [LJ (B) , 174; emphasis 
added]; 
whereas 
[t]ho• these and some other exclusive privileges arise from 
nature, they are generally the creatures of the civil law. 
Such are monopolies and all privileges of corporations•••• 
[LJ(B), 17 5; emphasis added}; 
Some of them [exclusive privileges] are founded on natural 
reason, and others are intirely the creatures of the civil 
constitutions of states [LJ(A), ii. 28]r 
inheritance is evidently founded on natural reason and 
equity [LJ(A), ii.28]r 
the author of a new book has an exclusive privilege of 
publishing and selling his book for 14 years. Some indeed 
contend that the book is an intire new production of the 
authors and therefor ought in justice to belong to him and 
his heir for ever, and that no one should be allowed to 
print or sell it but those to whom he has given leave, by 
the very laws of naturall reason. . ‘ 
Although Smith also explained the detrimental effects of 
monopolies on the opulence of a society, and was therefore 
harmful to the community, one must not take this as the very 
reason for his condemnation. To Smith, harmful consequences 
would not provoke the resentment of an impartial spectator. This 
is because an impartial spectator only sympathizes with concrete 
situations,* he does not have the abstract idea of efficiency, 
allocation of resources and economic growth. A passage 
concerning the interference with free trade in the Wealth of 
Nations illustrates such an argument. When Smith condemned that 
the law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the 
trade of a shopkeeper, and that which obliged the farmer to 
exercise the trade of a corn merchant were "evident violation of 
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natural liberty, and therefore unjust'", his reason was from the 
view point of spectator theory: 
The man who employs either his labour or his stock in a 
• greater variety of ways than his situation renders 
necessary, can never hurt his neighbour by underselling him 
[WN, IV. V. 15； emphasis added]. 
To Smith , therefore, if that man had hurt his neighbour, 
resentment from the impartial spectator would have been 
provoked,a general rule of justice, and hence a law of justice, 
would have evolved. Now that these laws did not arise from this 
natural reason, and therefore contrary to nature, they should be 
condemned. Smith‘s concern for justice and natural liberty 
cannot be understood without the spectator theory. 
‘ WN, IV. V. 16. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
The idea that economics should be a positive science 
dominates for nearly half a century. It is unavoidable that the 
works of past scholars are sometimes forced to be interpreted in 
a modern way. But we have to be careful that in such an 
interpretation, the original intention of past scholars must not 
be sacrificed. The present work is motivated by this caveat. 
Stigler charged Adam Smith that there is no Stiglerian 
theory of regulation in the Wealth of Nations. .He demanded Smith ‘ 
to be a positive economist. West argued that it is not Smith .s 
intention to propose a positive theory of regulation. He was 
more interested in the normative side, namely that the government 
can improve the constitution of a nation by adhering to the 
"general rule of law". 
工 have shown in this study how West's idea of the "general 
rule of law" as a guideline for constitution making found in the 
Wealth of Nations is imprecise. The natural jurisprudence of 
Adam Smith is founded on the spectator theory and the theory of 
justice. It is also my point that the role of justice played in 
the Wealth of Nations has a basis which can be traced in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiment and the Lectures on Jurisprudence. 
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This point helps us clarify Stigler's misunderstanding about the 
role of justice in Smith. 
The present work is in fact a continuation of the debate. 
It is a study of Adam Smith ‘ s conception of regulation and 
government. We find that Smith held a jurisprudential view of 
regulation. Justice is the core of law, and the role of the 
government is the strict administration of justice, so that 
positive law may approach natural law. 
With regard to Stiglei: [1971b],工 have not tackled all the 
problems he raised concerning the seemingly irrational elements 
in the political aspects in the Wealth of Nations. I largely 
accept the view of West that Smith knew better than anyone about 
the operation of self-interest in the political domain. I have 
to repeat my statement here that some of those problems could 
only be solved by economic historians. They have to test 
S t i g l e r h y p o t h e s i s about the establishment of regulations in 
Smithis time. 
One point 工 want to make is about the role of opinion and 
prejudice in politics. As a positive economist, Stigler is 
impatient to these terms. To explain the existence of economic 
regulations in these terms is non-refutable. This is probably 
Stigler,s attack. Strictly speaking, however, the Stiglerian 
view of regulation does not imply the whole story: Stigler's 
theory only establishes a correlation between self—interest and 
regulation. But to say Smith was ignorant in the political 
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process is, I think, an insult to him. His huge amount of 
knowledge in the social and political history of mankind can 
testify to this point. Prejudice and opinion of citizens are 
concrete to Smith; they are as concrete as self-interest. It is 
Smith Is belief that prejudice and opinion play a role in the 
making of laws of police, i.e., what we now call regulation. But 
工 do not think that self-interested merchants and manufacturers 
can easily establish environmental regulations for their benefits 
if the public does not hold an opinion that environmental 
degradation is a problem and its protection is essential to their 
life- 工 do not think that minimuin wage laws can easily be 
legislated if the labour class do not have the prejudice and 
opinion that it could secure their interest• It seems to me that 
in many instances prejudice and opinion of the people supporting 
and demanding regulations are played into the hands of the 
special interest groups who speed up and secure such regulations 
to their own benefit. In this perspective, the Smithian view is 
much broader than the Stiglerian view. 
There is a difference with regard to the discussion of 
regulation between Adam Smith and modern economists. Modern 
economists view Adam Smith primarily as an economist: he 
discussed value, distribution and growth; he analyzed economic 
effects of particular institutions and government interventions,* 
he talked about efficiency. So, to what extent can we say that 
Smith is more a preacher of natural liberty than efficiency? 
Recognition of the fact that Adam Smith is also the author of the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments and a lecturer on jurisprudence points 
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to the answer. Adam Smith the economist viewed regulation as an 
economic phenomenon, whose job is to analyze its economic 
effects. This is half of the job for a modern economist, for 
another half, according to Stigler, should be the analysis of the 
legislative process behind regulation, which was neglected by 
Smith. However, Adam Smith is more than an economist. Adam 
Smith the philosopher and historian viewed regulation as a 
perversion to the general principle of the origin of law. This 
is the jurisprudential view of regulation, the law of police. 
This general principle of law is only one aspect of Adam Smith's 
whole philosophy, the natural philosophy of society (to be 
discussed below)• It is his natural philosophy that 
characterizes Smith more as a preacher of natural liberty. 
Adam Smith's theory of law, based on justice, which in turn 
on spectator theory, can be contrasted with that of his 
predecessors. According to Thomas Hobbes, society was not 
possible if there was not a civil government. But the existence 
of civil government depends on the obedience paid to the supreme 
magistrate. "the law of the civil magistrate, therefore, ought 
to be regarded as the sole ultimate standards of what was just 
and unjust, of what was right and wrong. This notion that law 
is the sole standard of right and wrong, is completely contrary 
to Adam Smith's conception of law, which is just the other way 
round. Law evolves from the general rules of justice, which is 
based on the sentiments of mankind. These sentiments, through 
the mechanism of sympathy, determine what is right and wrong. 
‘ TMS, VII- iii.2.1 
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What is right and wrong is, therefore, antecedent to law. 
Constitution—making is an important theme in Adam Smith's 
social philosophy. James Buchanan has also talked about this. 
However, Adam Smith would find his theory too rationalistic 
compared to his naturalistic approach. Buchanan talks about 
constitution—making in a prisoner dilemma framework. In the 
state of anarchy, men tend to take hold of others‘ possessions. 
Resources for defense are therefore necessary. Recognition of 
this tends to make agreement of disarming by men because if 
everyone abides by this agreement there is a net gain in society 
from the saving of resources for defense. However, when there 
are numerous individuals this agreement is bound to be violated. 
Now the government comes out as the referee to enforce such an 
agreement and punish those who deviate. 
But I will ask, and surely Adam Smith, what if the 
individuals are not that rational• Is society still possible? 
In this contractarian model, society might still be possible even 
if the individuals are not that rational, though this society 
would be very poor. And if his model is to explain constitution— 
making, Buchanan has to confront this issue. It is surprising 
that Buchanan did not I 
Adam Smith's theory begins with the human nature. It is 
solely his human nature which makes man fit for his society. 
There are imperfections in man: self-interest, prejudices, 
opinions, self-deceit. He always wants to live leisurely, 
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comfortable; he wants to be admired,- he loves vanity. He is 
always tempted to take hold of others‘ possessions. Such men in 
the state of nature could not survive. But Smith is not 
Hobbesian丨 Man also has agreeable propensities to offset 
partially those negative propensities• He has fellow—feeling and 
sympathizes with others; he seeks agreement from his fellow men; 
he wants to be approved of by others, and be worthy of approval. 
These propensities, however, are not always strong enough to curb 
those negative ones, especially self-interest. This problem is 
partly solved by rules of justice and morality evolved from 
experience accumulated from the simplest society down to the most 
civilized society, through the parental and religious teaching. 
Rules of justice are established on the basis that everyone is 
a spectator. Positive laws are legislated by civil government 
to sanction those violation of the rules of justice. An orderly ‘ 
society is possible by the invisible hand of Nature. 
So Adam Smith's system is not a contrived one. He is also 
a man of system, but one of natural system. His whole 
philosophy is naturalistic, and optimistic. In the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, rules of morality and justice evolve naturally 
from the propensities universal to human nature. No authority 
is needed to decide of what is right and wrong , what is to be 
approbated and disapprobated, what is just and unjust. On the 
contrary, the sense of approbation and disapprobation and that 
of justice and injustice are based on the natural sentiments and 
affections of mankind. In the Lecture Notes, laws and government 
evolve naturally from the rules of justice and other human 
68 
propensities such as the tendency to admire and believe in 
authority or prejudices and opinions. They are not contrived by 
the people of the society because of their usefulness. In the 
Wealtli of Nations, self—inteirest of individuals promote the 
welfare of the society while contrived governmental interference 
of individual actions and of the market may not necessarily 
promote public welfare, but most of the time makes things even 
worse than before. Everyone only sees the interest of himself 
and yet society will not become a mess but better off. This is 
the force of natural liberty. And this naturalistic philosophy 
is also optimistic. Self-interest and other negative 
propensities of human nature will not make society impossible,* 
indeed, they tend to be counteracted by other positive 
propensities such as sympathy and benevolence. On the contrary, 
so long as liberty pervades the air, self — interest is the ‘ 
foundation of the wealth of a nation. And even if there are 
hundred absurd regulations, this principle of self-interest is 
so powerful as to makes men try their best to subvert them, as 
Stigler [1971b] has notedJ Because of this optimistic 
conception, to Adam Smith, what is natural is good. Any order 
that tends to pervert this natural course which the society takes 
should be condemned. Therefore regulation contrary to nature 
should be criticized. The positive approaches coincides with the 
normative approaches through his natural philosophy. This is the 
essence of Adam Smith. 
‘ Stigler 1971b, p.237. 
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